EU Region-Building in the Neighbourhood. The Eastern Partnership’s Contribution in the South Caucasus. EU Diplomacy Paper 04/2017 by van den Boom, Benedikt
DEPARTMENT OF EU INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS AND DIPLOMACY STUDIES
EU Region-Building in 
the Neighbourhood
The Eastern Partnership’s 
Contribution in the 
South Caucasus
Benedikt van den Boom
EU Diplomacy Paper 04 / 2017
 Department of EU International 
Relations and Diplomacy Studies 
 
 
 
 
 
EU Diplomacy Papers 
4/2017 
 
 
 
 
 
EU Region-Building in the Neighbourhood: 
The Eastern Partnership’s Contribution  
in the South Caucasus 
 
Benedikt van den Boom 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Benedikt van den Boom 
 
 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail info.ird@coleurope.eu | www.coleurope.eu/ird 
EU Diplomacy Paper 4/2017 
2 
About the Author 
 
Benedikt van den Boom holds a BA in International Politics and History from Jacobs 
University Bremen (2015) and a MA in EU International Relations and Diplomacy Studies 
from the College of Europe in Bruges (2016). Currently, he works as an analyst at the 
European Stability Initiative in Berlin. This paper is based on his Master’s thesis at the 
College of Europe (Chopin Promotion). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Editorial Team: 
Giorgio Bassotti, Tommaso Emiliani, Sieglinde Gstöhl, Ludovic Highman, Sara Hurtekant, 
Aurore Loste, Sofia López Piqueres, Simon Schunz 
Dijver 11 | BE-8000 Bruges, Belgium | Tel. +32 (0)50 477 251 | Fax +32 (0)50 477 250 | 
E-mail ird.info@coleurope.eu | www.coleurope.eu/ird  
Views expressed in the EU Diplomacy Papers are those of the authors only and do not 
necessarily reflect positions of either the series editors or the College of Europe.   
Benedikt van den Boom 
3 
Abstract 
 
The promotion of regionalisation is part of the foreign policy of the European Union 
(EU). However, a closer understanding of the mechanisms by which its policies work 
towards this goal is lacking. Taking the South Caucasus as a case, this paper asks how 
the Eastern Partnership contributes to region-building. Based on policy analysis, 
discourse analysis and interviews, the study adopts a four-layered understanding of 
region-building as the promotion of closer cross-border contacts: Regarding 
economic linkages, the analysis underlines Georgia’s gateway function. On political 
linkages, the analysis assigns importance to regulatory harmonisation as a bottom-up 
tool against divisive regional discourses. Cross-border management fulfils a similar 
technical role for the promotion of security linkages. Concerning cultural linkages, 
Georgia is analysed as a hub for common socialisation and people-to-people 
contacts. Derived from these findings, the paper induces three general hypotheses 
about the mechanisms of EU contributions to region-building: while combining 
bilateral with multilateral approaches and functional spill-over effects contribute to 
region-building, the inclusion of non-state actors does not advance region-building.  
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Introduction 
 
According to the Association Agreement between the European Union (EU) and 
Georgia, both parties are “committed to promoting cross-border and inter-regional 
cooperation by both sides in the spirit of good neighbourly relation”.1 Efforts under the 
Eastern Partnership (EaP) are thus effectively linked to inter-regional cooperation. The 
promotion of regional cooperation as a vehicle for stability and prosperity has 
traditionally informed EU foreign policy.2 By contrast, the EU’s response to former Soviet 
countries only incrementally developed a region-centred paradigm.3 Although some 
studies analyse EU policies of regionalisation,4 gaps remain in the existing literature 
regarding the mechanisms by which a region is constructed.5  
Given this context, the aim of this study is twofold. On the one hand, it attempts 
to illustrate how the EU contributes to region-building in its neighbourhood, and more 
specifically the EaP’s contributions in the South Caucasus. On the other hand, it seeks 
to formulate a set of general hypotheses on mechanisms of externally-propelled 
region-building, which can be used for additional policy-oriented research. 
Combining these two aims, the paper follows an inductive research design towards a 
better understanding of region-building. It is structured in three parts. The first section 
provides a constructivist conceptualisation of region-building, drawing on the South 
Caucasus as a case study. The second section dissects the contribution of various EaP 
policies and initiatives on four dimensions of region-building, spanning economic 
interdependence, political teleology, security cooperation and cultural exchanges. 
Based on this analysis, the third section formulates general hypotheses on region-
building mechanisms. The paper argues that the EaP mainly contributes to region-
building in the South Caucasus by means of pursuing sectoral bottom-up approaches 
that combine bilateral and multilateral logics. 
                                                 
1 European Union, “Association Agreement between the European Union and the European 
Atomic Energy Community and their Member States, of the one Part, and Georgia, of the other 
Part”, Official Journal of the European Union, L 261, 30 August 2014, p. 6. 
2 Smith, Karen E., European Union Foreign Policy in a Changing World, Cambridge, Polity Press, 
2008, 2nd ed., p. 2; Söderbaum, Frederik, Stalgren, Patrik & van Langenhove, Luk, “The EU as a 
Global Actor and the Dynamics of Interregionalism: A Comparative Analysis”, Journal of 
European Integration, vol. 27, no. 3, 2005, pp. 365-380.  
3 Delcour, Laure, Shaping the Post-Soviet Space: EU Policies and Approaches to Region-
Building, Farnham, Ashgate, 2011, p. 9. 
4 Haarstrup, Toni, “EU as Mentor? Promoting Regionalism as External Relations Practice in EU-
Africa Relations”, Journal of European Integration, vol. 35, no. 7, 2013, pp. 791-792. 
5 Delcour, Shaping the Post-Soviet Space, op. cit., p. 78 fn23. 
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Conceptualisation 
 
This brief theoretical section aims at two things. On the one hand, it operationalises the 
main approach of region-building as a four-fold construction of closer linkages. On the 
other hand, it selects the South Caucasus as case and the Eastern Partnership as 
source for units of analysis. This provides the backdrop for scrutinising how the Eastern 
Partnership contributes to region-building. 
Understanding Region-Building 
It has been pointed out that no universal understanding of regions exists.6 
Consequently, Delcour suggests constructivism as one possible frame of reference to 
conceptualise the promotion of regionalism.7 Informed by this approach, regions are 
defined here as a “limited number of states linked by a geographical relationship”8 
that are “constructed entities”.9 This process of construction or region-building10 is 
understood here as the “processes leading to increased cooperation and 
integration”.11 Region-building can be both “intentional and unintentional”,12 resulting 
for instance from policy design,13 social interaction14 or external pressure.15 
Börzel suggests to fcus on “processes and structures of region-building in terms 
of closer economic, political, security and socio-cultural linkages between states and 
societies that geographically proximate”.16 For the purpose of this study, economic 
                                                 
6 Fawn, Rick, “Regions and their Study: Wherefrom, What for and Whereto”, Review of 
International Studies, vol. 35, S1, 2009, p. 10. 
7 Delcour, Shaping the Post-Soviet Space, op. cit., p. 15. 
8 Nye, Joseph, International Regionalism, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1968, p. vii. 
9 Hettne, Björn, Inotai, András & Sunkel, Osvaldo (eds.), Globalism and New Regionalism, 
Helsinki, UNI/WIDER, 1999, p. xv.  
10 Region-building is certainly not the only possible approach. For an alternative discussion on 
regionalism see Warlick-Leigh, Alex, “Towards a Conceptual Framework for Regionalisation: 
Bridging New Regionalism and Integration Theory”, Review of International Political Economy, 
vol. 13, no. 5, 2006, pp. 750-771. For an alternative proposal of regionness, see Hettne, Björn & 
Söderbaum, Frederik, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness”, New Political Economy, vol. 5, no. 3, 
2000, pp. 461-466. 
11 Delcour, Shaping the Post-Soviet Space, op. cit., p. 6. 
12 Wunderlich, Jens-Uwe, Regionalism, Globalisation and International Order: Europe and 
South-East Asia, Farnham, Ashgate, 2007, p. 137. 
13 Neumann, Iver B., “A Region-Building Approach to Northern Europe”, Review of International 
Studies, vol. 20, no. 1, 1994, pp. 53-74. 
14 Adler, Emanuel & Crawford, Beverly “Constructing a Mediterranean Region: A Cultural 
Approach”, Paper Presented at the Conference on the Convergence of Civilizations? 
Constructing a Mediterranean Region, Lisbon, Fundação Oriente, 6 June 2002, p. 5. 
15 Makarychev, Andrey, “Russia-EU: Competing Logics of Region-Building”, DGAP Analyse, no. 
1, Berlin, March 2012. 
16 Börzel, Tanja A., “Conclusion: Do All Roads Lead to Regionalism”, in Börzel, Tanja A. et al. 
(eds.), Roads to Regionalism, Aldershot, Ashgate, 2012, p. 255. 
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linkages are understood to encompass forms of interdependence in trade and 
infrastructure. Political linkages are conceptualised in two ways, as an overarching 
narrative, which is created in the upper echelons of political power, and as 
administrative cooperation, which reflects bottom-up processes of political linkage. 
Security linkages are defined as alliance systems and specific policy cooperation. 
Cultural linkages refer to people-to-people contacts. This four-fold operationalisation 
structures the subsequent analysis. 
Selecting Case and Data 
De Waal advances the case that “the South Caucasus would benefit greatly from 
closer regional integration”.17 This assessment follows from two observations. On the 
one hand, the countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia form a meso-region 
according to Sakwa’s taxonomy.18 They do not only share a common history and 
socialisation under Soviet rule,19 but are also constrained by the great powers of Russia, 
Turkey and Iran in their vicinity.20 On the other hand, in the proverbial assessment of a 
former EU Special Representative to the area, the South Caucasus is a “broken 
region”.21 Recent escalations in the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorny-
Karabakh have ossified the closed border between the countries.22 Additionally, the 
entire ‘Eastern Neighbourhood’23 faces a choice between competing European and 
Eurasian integration projects, epitomised in Georgia’s decision for an Association 
Agreement with the EU and Armenia’s decision to instead join the Eurasian Economic 
Union (EEU).24 This mixture of pre-existing regional features combined with a lack of 
actual regionalisation makes the South Caucasus an interesting case to study region-
building. 
                                                 
17 De Waal, Thomas, “A Broken Region: The Persistent Failure of Integration Projects in the South 
Caucasus”, Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 64, no. 9, 2012, p. 1721. 
18 Sakwa, Richard, “The Clash of Regionalisms and Caucasian Conflicts”, Europe-Asia Studies, 
vol. 63, no. 3, 2011, p. 468. 
19 Iskandaryan, Alexandr, “The South Caucasus: Becoming a Region or Trying to not be One”, 
in Iskandaryan, Alexandr (ed.), Identities, Ideologies & Institutions: A Decade of Insight into the 
Caucasus, Yerevan, Caucasus Institute, 2011, pp. 9-15. 
20 German, Tracey, “’Good Neighbours or Distant Relatives?’ Regional Identity and 
Cooperation in the South Caucasus”, Central Asian Survey, vol. 31, no. 2, 2012, pp. 141-142. 
21 Semneby, Peter in Lobjakas, Ahto, “EU Envoy Calls South Caucasus ‘Broken Region’”, Radio 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Prague, 3 October 2007. 
22 Broers, Laurence, “Decisive Diplomacy Essential to Securing Fragile Nagorny Karabakh 
Ceasefire”, Chatham House – The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 11 April 2016. 
23 Delcour, Shaping the Post-Soviet Space, op. cit., p. 90 fn52. 
24 Popescu, Nico, “Eurasian Union: The Real, the Imaginary and the Likely”, European Union 
Institute for Security Studies Chaillot Paper, no. 132, September 2014; Makarychev, op. cit. 
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The paper focuses on the EaP as the main external stimulus to deliberately or 
unintentionally infuse region-building. Conceived in 2008, it brings together the six 
Eastern neighbours of the EU: Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia.25 The EaP aggregates various policies, instruments and initiatives.26 In its 
broadest strokes, the EaP advances economic integration and political dialogue in 
cooperation with governments and civil society initiatives.27 The addition of cross-
cutting issues to be addressed multilaterally to the ENP agenda constitutes a major 
change in the EU’s take on region-building.28 This then poses the policy-relevant 
question, how the EaP in fact contributes to region-building. 
To establish a robust basis for such an analysis, five data sources are used.29 First, 
the study looks at the Association Agreement between the EU and Georgia as main 
contractual document. Second, it adds a wide range of activities under the EaP. Third, 
speech acts by the relevant external actors and the heads of state of the respective 
South Caucasian countries are used. Fourth, the study draws on recent public opinion 
data from the Caucasus Barometer. Last, the findings from these sources are 
contextualised by five expert interviews. Taking Armenia’s turn towards the Russian-led 
EEU as a significant rupture, data collection starts in September 2013. The various 
policies and initiatives under the EaP are treated as discreet units of analysis. Thus, the 
research design qualifies as an embedded single-case study.30 
Analysis 
 
This section traces the EaP’s contribution to region-building on those four dimensions 
of closer contacts, which Börzel suggests,31 namely economic interdependence, 
political teleology, security cooperation and cultural exchanges. For each subsection, 
the analysis proceeds in two steps, first describing the status quo and then scrutinising 
how EaP policies and initiatives contribute to these linkages. Overall, this section 
                                                 
25 Council of the European Union, “Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit”, 
8435/09 (Press 78), Brussels, 7 May 2009. 
26 Grodmadski, Gregorz, The Eastern Partnership after Five Years: Time for Deep Rethinking, 
Study EXPO/B/AFET/FWC/2013-08/Lot1/01, Brussels, European Parliament Directorate-General 
for External Policies of the Union, February 2015, pp. 7-10. 
27 Boonstra, Jos & Shapovalova, Natalia, “The EU’s Eastern Partnership: One Year Backwards”, 
FRIDE Working Paper, no. 99, Madrid, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el 
Diálogo Exterior, May 2010. 
28 Delcour, Shaping the Post-Soviet Space, op. cit., p. 86. 
29 Based on the call for triangulation in Yin, Robert K., Case Study Research: Design and 
Methods, Thousand Oaks, Sage, 2014, 5th ed., p. 241. 
30 Ibid., pp. 50-56. 
31 Börzel, “Conclusion: Do All Roads Lead to Regionalism”, op. cit. 
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provides a comprehensive stocktaking of the various ways, in which the EaP 
deliberately and unintentionally contributes to South Caucasian region-building. 
Economic Interdependence 
The first question is how economically interdependent the three South Caucasian 
countries currently are, for which Table 1 presents a snapshot overview. There is no 
reported trade between Armenia and Azerbaijan, so Georgia offers the most active 
South Caucasian market. Nonetheless, external actors are more important for trade 
relations than the immediate neighbours. These patterns are nothing new, however, 
as Caucasian trade was always directed at the Soviet centre or other Eastern bloc 
republics.32 Therefore, Table 1 suggests external dependence instead of economic 
interdependence. 
Table 1: Trade Relations in the South Caucasus (2014)33 
 Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia 
Imports from    
Armenia --- 0 % 2.5 % 
Azerbaijan 0 % --- 7.4 % 
Georgia 1.7 % 1 % --- 
EU-28 27.2 % 14.3 % 28 % 
Russia 25.7 % 29.5 % 6.7 % 
Exports to    
Armenia --- 0 % 10.1 % 
Azerbaijan 0 % --- 19.0 % 
Georgia 4.2 % 2.4 % --- 
EU-28 32.5 % 54.5 % 20.3 % 
Russia 20.4 % 2.9 % 9.6 % 
Notes: (a) Percentage of overall import or export for 2014; 
(b) Data relating to EU-28 from European Commission 
 
 
Any analysis on the EaP’s contribution in addressing this status quo must acknowledge 
that the European policy focus is on promoting trade between EaP countries and the 
EU, not on facilitating trade among them.34 Nonetheless, it is implicitly assumed that 
trade will be encouraged between neighbours, if all of them align their legislative 
framework, for instance regarding sanitary standards, with the European one. Once 
                                                 
32 German, Tracey, Regional Cooperation in the South Caucasus: Good Neighbours or Distant 
Relatives, London, Routledge, 2016, pp. 21-22. 
33 World Integrated Trade Solutions, 2014 World Trade [Dataset], Washington D.C., World Bank 
Group, no date; European Commission, Implementation of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy: Statistics, SWD(2015) 77 final, Brussels, 25 March 2015, p. 34. 
34 Interview with an Official, DG Trade, European Commission, Brussels, 21 March 2016. 
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Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia have similar or equal rules, economic 
interdependence is more likely to develop among them.35  
This starting point opens the door to two observations on Armenia and Georgia. 
On the one hand, the Armenian President argues that as “member of the EEU, which 
most closely meets EU standards, we could become a bridge for European 
countries”.36 On the other hand, Georgia’s Prime Minister expects the country to “be 
a major hub for trade throughout the region and a key player in global commerce”.37 
These quotes signal Armenia’s and Georgia’s gateway function. By opening the door 
to reduced-customs trade with Russia or the EU respectively, regulatory harmonisation 
under the EaP could stimulate inter-regional trade in the South Caucasus despite 
inherent incompatibilities between the EaP and the EEU.38  
It needs to be underlined, however, that the de facto differentiation between 
the three South Caucasian countries under EaP trade policy may affect such region-
building. For the moment, however, the institutions of the EU “do not really know”, what 
these effects might be.39 Therefore, the study probes one level further and analyses 
the contribution of the EaP to two different infrastructure projects, as they provide the 
groundwork for future economic interdependence.  
Regarding regional transportation networks, the EU-Georgia Association 
Agreement mandates the partners to improve “transport flows between Georgia, the 
EU and third countries in the region […] integrating progress achieved under various 
regional transport cooperation arrangements”.40 This clause designates a regional hub 
function to Georgia, aiming to deepen regional economic dependencies by 
bilaterally supporting Georgia’s crossroad function. At the same time, the clause 
considers multilateral aspects of the EaP and embeds all bilateral efforts in Georgia in 
this wider framework. For instance, the EaP transport priorities include six segments in 
                                                 
35 Interview with Chris Kendall, Political Counsellor, European External Action Service, Brussels, 8 
March 2016. 
36 Sargsyan, Serzh, President of the Republic of Armenia, “With Italian Parliamentarians”, 
Speech, Rome, 10 April 2015.  
37 Kvirikashvili, Giorgi, Prime Minister of Georgia, “TANAP will Increase Economic Development 
in Georgia”, Caspian Energy, Interview, Tbilisi, 4 April 2016. 
38 European Commission, EU-Armenia: New Context but Same Resolve to Take Partnership 
Forward, Memo, Brussels, 9 December 2013, p. 2; Council of the European Union, EU-Armenia 
Cooperation Council, Press 16/16, Brussels, 18 January 2016 
39 Interview Kendall, op cit. 
40 European Union, “Association Agreement”, op. cit., Art. 294, p. 110. 
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the South Caucasus, of which four have cross-border implications.41 The idea is for “the 
Partner countries [to] join up between themselves”42 as to provide an avenue towards 
closer economic links for trade.43 Thus, the EaP attempts to change the status quo 
observed above. 
Regarding energy-related infrastructure, similar observations apply.  Aiming to 
strengthen the countries’ resilience, the European External Action Service (EEAS) seeks 
the establishment of a regional energy and electricity grid, connecting Armenia and 
Azerbaijan to Georgia.44 Accordingly, the EU-Georgia Association Agreement 
explicitly requires “the promotion of bilateral and regional integration in this field”.45 
Thus, multilateral contributions of the EaP are channelled under one dedicated 
flagship initiative, for instance towards a South Caucasian energy efficiency 
programme.46 The most prolific project was the ‘Interstate Oil and Gas Transportation 
to Europe’, better known under its acronym INOGATE, an “EU-funded regional energy 
cooperation programme in support of the priorities in the field of energy of the EaP”.47 
Importantly, however, these priorities differ in the South Caucasus. Georgia is a transit 
country, Azerbaijan a producer and Armenia a consumer of energy resources, thus 
making it difficult to devise a common policy approach.48  
In sum, this section on economic interdependence demonstrates two points. 
First, trade in the South Caucasus is directed at external partners, not at neighbours. It 
is unclear how the differentiation between Georgia and Armenia will affect trade 
flows. Yet it can be argued that the two countries mutually open doors to larger 
markets. The EaP contributes to economic region-building not only unintentionally 
through the effects of harmonisation, but also purposefully by means of its transport 
and energy policy. Second, there is, however, an essential limit to this argument. Trade 
is fundamentally a bilateral policy area, as are energy and road corridors. They are 
not per se devised to link the countries among themselves, but to connect Europe to 
                                                 
41 IDEA II, “Eastern Partnership Regional Transport Study: Final Report”, Transport Dialogue and 
Networks Interoperability II, Brussels, June 2015, pp. 16, 18. 
42 European Commission, Joint Declaration: Future of Eastern Partnership Transport 
Cooperation, Luxembourg, 9 October 2013, p. 2. 
43 IDEA II, op. cit., p. 22. 
44 Interview with Boris Iarochevitch, Head of Division, European External Action Service, Brussels, 
4 March 2016. 
45 European Union, “Association Agreement”,  op. cit., Art. 298, p. 111. 
46 European External Action Service, The Eastern Partnership Multilateral Platforms, Brussels, 2016. 
47 European External Action Service, “Regional Programmes”, European Union Delegation to 
Georgia, Tbilisi, no date. 
48 Interview Iarochevitch, op. cit. 
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the wider world. This then opens the question whether political processes support this 
economic region-building, to which the analysis turns next. 
Political Teleology 
This section analyses the contribution of the EaP to closer political linkages in the South 
Caucasus on the assumption that “the lower the level, the better the contact 
[because] on the high level, narratives are employed by participants”.49 First, this 
section reveals the broken top-down discourse on the region. Second, it explores the 
counter-point of bottom-up political linkages, centring on processes of harmonisation 
and differentiation. Thus, this section shows the constructive value of technical 
relations for region-building. 
Regarding top-down political linkages, the question is whether the political 
leaders converge in their perceptions of the Caucasus. First, Azerbaijan’s President 
Aliyev employs multiple regional discourses. Describing Azerbaijan, Georgia and 
Turkey as “countries of Eurasia”,50 his discourse oscillates between “region of South 
Caucasus”51 and “broad region of the Caspian”.52 Second, Armenia’s President 
Sargsyan labels “the Armenia-Turkey state border as the last closed border in 
Europe”.53 At the same time, he lauds his country’s accession to the EEU as “integration 
in the Eurasian region”.54 Sargsyan refers to “the Caucasus” as such only when 
discursively joining Armenia and the EU.55 In contrast to this, Georgian President 
Margvelashvili aims “to turn the Caucasus into a region of opportunities”.56 Georgian 
leaders portray negotiations with Turkey, Azerbaijan and Armenia as “building our 
region - Caucasian region”.57  
                                                 
49 Ibid. 
50 Aliyev, Ilham, President of Azerbaijan, “Second Meeting of the Southern Gas Corridor 
Advisory Council”, Speech, Baku, 29 February 2016. 
51 Aliyev, Ilham, “Joint Press Statement of Ilham Aliyev and Donald Tusk”, Speech, Baku, 22 
August 2015.  
52 Ibid. 
53 Sargsyan, Serzh, President of the Republic of Armenia, “John F. Kennedy School of 
Government”, Speech, Cambridge, 30 March 2016. 
54 Sargsyan, Serzh, President of the Republic of Armenia, “Supreme Eurasian Economic 
Council”, Speech, Minsk, 10 October 2014. 
55 See, for instance, Sargsyan, Serzh, President of the Republic of Armenia, “Second Eastern 
Partnership Summit”, Speech, Warsaw, 30 September 2011; Sargsyan, Serzh, President of the 
Republic of Armenia, “5th Media Forum: At the Foot of Mount Ararat”, Speech, Yerevan, 18 
March 2015. 
56 Margvelashvili, Giorgi, President of Georgia, “Interdisciplinary Centre Herzliya”, Speech, 
Herzliya, 21 October 2015. 
57 Margvelashvili, Giorgi, President of Georgia, “At a Forum in Baku”, Speech, Baku, 10 March 
2016. 
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This brief discourse analysis provides three insights. First, Georgia is the country 
to most consistently apply a South Caucasian regional frame. Second, Armenia and 
Azerbaijan – and to a lesser extent Georgia – employ a multi-faceted discourse of 
regional identity, combining Caspian, Caucasian, European and Eurasian elements. 
Third, the EU in general and the EaP in particular, only very rarely feature in this top-
down elite perception. This is most saliently reflected in a statement by Armenia’s 
President Sargsyan on the EaP: 
The criterion of grouping partners was not clear […] and I think that this 
is the reason that at least one of the Eastern Partnership’s components 
– the regional cooperation component – was doomed to failure. I still 
do not understand the criterion of grouping Armenia and Azerbaijan 
into one partnership – different opportunities, different approaches, 
different goals.58 
This quote shows the powerful impact of elite discourses on political teleology for the 
South Caucasus. Despite immediate geographical proximity, regional cooperation 
under the EaP is rejected and differentiation called for. Accordingly, one EU 
Delegation’s official emphasises that “[f]rankly, we speak here about three very 
different countries and having [an] homogenous approach is not feasible”.59 This 
becomes problematic once political linkages serve as component of region-building 
processes. A common teleology would be required to combine various countries into 
a region, but this is not given in the South Caucasus, where the “time is not ripe yet” 
for big common policies.60  
This then poses the question whether the EaP can contribute to political linkages 
by means of bottom-up procedures instead. On the underlying assumption that “the 
[technical] issues are the same everywhere” in the South Caucasus,61 regulatory 
convergence in sectoral policies becomes a central element of the EaP.62 Bilaterally, 
the EU supports their partners’ administration to bring legislation in line with European 
                                                 
58 Sargsyan, Serzh, President of the Republic of Armenia, “High-Level Meeting on the 5th 
Anniversary of the Eastern Partnership”, Speech, Prague, 25 April 2014. 
59 Interview with Kaido Sirel, Head of Operations Section, Delegation of the European Union to 
Georgia, Bruges, 1 April 2016. 
60 Interview Iarochevitch, op cit. 
61 Ibid. 
62 European Commission, Eastern Partnership: Communication to the Council and to the 
European Parliament, COM(2008) 823 final, Brussels, 3 December 2008, p. 3. 
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requirements.63 Multilaterally, administrators of the EaP countries are expected to 
become socialised. The relevant EaP platform “was particularly active, with input and 
ideas coming from partner country government representatives, business associations 
and leading donors”.64  
This focus on harmonisation warrants differentiation as openly inscribed in the 
EaP since its last review.65 If its effect “on the face of it [is] divergence instead of 
convergence”,66 then the question is, how differentiation affects region-building. 
Differentiation is not pre-determined but depends on the conceptual formulations of 
preferences and expectations by partner countries. Once determined, coinciding 
policy areas signal the space in which potential for further integration exists. As such, 
differentiation presents a short-cut to those fields, in which harmonisation and thus 
bottom-up political linkages are possible. This logic results in the conclusion that 
differentiation “is not the detriment of integration”, but one side of the EaP, which 
clarifies the potential for sectoral political region-building in the South Caucasus.67  
Environmental cooperation is one such field, in which all three countries of the 
South Caucasus prefer collaborating. On this topic, the EU-Georgia Association 
Agreement induces teamwork on the “regional [level], including through the existing 
structures of cooperation in South Caucasus”.68 This clause refers to the Regional 
Environmental Centre (REC). Its work brings together national administrators, civil 
society representatives and environmental experts, thus fostering a regional 
understanding of environmental problems.69 Given its tri-national directorate, this is the 
“only institution in which all three countries come together”.70 Since this centre is a civil 
society actor to the multilateral EaP panel on energy and environment as well, an 
interaction effect in terms of political linkages exists. By contractually obliging Georgia 
                                                 
63 For an example from Georgia see European Commission, Implementation of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy in Georgia: Progress in 2014 and Recommendations for Actions, 
SWD(2015) 66 final, Brussels, 25 March 2015, p. 12. 
64 European Commission, Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy: Eastern 
Partnership Implementation Report, SWD(2015) 76 final, Brussels, 25 March 2015, p. 12. 
65 European Commission, Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Review of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, JOIN(2015) 50, Brussels, 18 November 2015, p. 15. 
66 Interview Kendall, op cit. 
67 I am very thankful for a sketch of this argument in an interview with Jose Medina Navarro, 
Cooperation Section, European Union Delegation in Yerevan, Bruges, 30 March 2016. 
68 European Union, “Association Agreement”, op. cit., Art. 303, p. 112. 
69 REC Caucasus, Who we are, The Regional Environmental Centre for the Caucasus, Tbilisi, no 
date. 
70 Interview Iarochevitch, op. cit. 
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to rely on this body, the EaP promotes bottom-up political linkages towards region-
building.  
In conclusion, this section provides two main lessons. On the one hand, elite 
discourses show that the dividing lines between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia are 
political.71 There are multiple constructions of allegiance and the South Caucasus is 
just one of them. However, there are additional bottom-up processes of political 
region-building, which are related to harmonisation and differentiation. This confirms 
Delcour’s initial expectation that the multilateral side to the EaP “may nurture dialogue 
on concrete issues among Eastern neighbours”.72  
Security Cooperation 
The third analytical section centres on security cooperation across the South 
Caucasus, proceeding in two parts. First, it explores the present system of alliances that 
permeate the region. Second, it explores Cross-Border Management (CBM) as a de-
politicised tool for security cooperation in the South Caucasus. In conclusion, the EaP’s 
contribution to region building is more pronounced in the technical realm. 
“Since 2013, both Russian and EU actors have increasingly referred to their 
common neighbourhood in terms of geopolitical choice.”73 Present security alliances 
in the South Caucasus reflect this statement.74 Table 2 shows in the left column the 
apprehension of public opinion for these realities: Armenia is cooperating with Russia, 
Georgia is seeking allegiance with the United States and European countries, and 
Azerbaijan is relying on Turkey. The right column of Table 2, however, reveals one 
potential obstacle to region-building by any external actor in the Caucasus, namely 
cross-border enmity between Armenia and Azerbaijan and Georgia’s rejection of 
Russia. 
  
                                                 
71 Interview Medina Navarro, op. cit. 
72 Delcour, Shaping the Post-Soviet Space, op. cit., p. 87. 
73 Delcour, Laure, “Between the Eastern Partnership and Eurasian Integration: Explaining Post-
Soviet Countries’ Engagement in (Competing) Region-Building Projects”, Problems of Post-
Communism, vol. 62, no. 6, 2015, p. 316. 
74 For an in-depth discussion of the foreign policy choices of the Caucasian republics, see 
German, Tracey, Good Neighbours or Distant Relatives, op. cit., pp. 33-58. 
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Table 2: Public Perception of Geostrategic Alliances (2013)75 
Main Friend Country Main Enemy 
Russia (84%) Armenia Azerbaijan (66%) 
Turkey (90%) Azerbaijan Armenia (90%) 
United States (36%) Georgia Russia (50%) 
Notes: (a) Answers “Don’t know”, “Refuse to answer” included in the 
analysis; (b) Only highest-scoring individual answers reported. 
 
 
The EaP operates in this multi-directional environment. This opens the question of how 
the EaP actually contributes to security cooperation as a tool for region-building. In this 
context, units of analysis encompass “multilateral and bilateral security dialogue and 
practical CSDP [Common Security and Defence Policy] cooperation”.76 Bilaterally, a 
framework agreement for Georgian participation in EU missions was agreed on.77 In 
addition, there are regular bilateral staff-to-staff consultations between EU member 
states and EaP partner countries.78 Last, they can align with CSDP-related declarations 
emanating from Brussels.79 Multilaterally, the respective panel conducted “joint CSDP 
courses and training programmes for officials from partner countries”.80 This, however, 
does not remove the obstacles to region-building identified above. Overall, the strong 
bilateral focus of the EaP with regard of security cooperation stands out.  
This warrants a broader look on the regional discourse. The Armenian accession 
to the EEU was “conditioned by new possibilities of Armenia's economic development 
and, why not, by the existing regional security system”.81 Georgia, in turn, seeks 
“integration into the EU and Euro-Atlantic institutions".82 This situation aggravates 
regional separations in the area. Georgia uses the EaP to create momentum towards 
                                                 
75 Items used: MAINFRN (“In your opinion, which country is currently main friend of your 
country?”) and MAINENEM (“In your opinion, which country is currently main enemy of your 
country?”) from Caucasus Resource Research Centre, 2013 Caucasus Barometer [Dataset], 
Tbilisi, no date.   
76 Council of the European Union, Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit, Riga, 22 
May 2015, Art. 22, p. 8.  
77 European Commission, SWD(2015) 66 final, op. cit., p. 9. 
78 European Commission, SWD(2015) 76 final, op. cit., p. 4. 
79 European Commission, Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 
Azerbaijan: Progress in 2014 and Recommendations for Actions, SWD(2015) 64 final, Brussels, 25 
March 2015, p. 8. 
80 European Commission, SWD(2015) 76 final, op. cit., p. 11. 
81 Sargsyan, Serzh, President of the Republic of Armenia, “On the Occasion of Independence 
Day”, Speech, Yerevan, 21 September 2014. 
82 Ivanishvili, Bidzina, Prime Minister of Georgia, “Statement”, Press Release, Tbilisi, 5 September 
2013.  
EU Diplomacy Paper 4/2017 
16 
NATO. In contrast, Armenia relies on Russia, which reinforced its choice for the EEU. This 
severely restricts the EaP’s contribution to region-building in the field of politicised 
security cooperation. From this analysis of alliance systems follows the question 
whether the EaP contributes to less politicised areas of security cooperation instead.  
The EU-Georgia Association Agreement includes one dedicated article on 
border management,83 and a multilateral flagship initiative on integrated border 
management exists within the EaP.84 Therefore, CBM merits its own analysis, despite 
the fact that one of the three borders within the South Caucasian region remains 
closed. Using Tbilisi as a hub, the programme includes “two bilateral cooperation 
components spanning Azerbaijan-Georgia and Georgia-Armenia, and three national 
components”.85 Therefore, the objectives of cooperation and coordination are 
translated into bilateral and multilateral projects, striving towards “cooperation on 
border control, border demarcation and trade facilitation”.86 These projects fall under 
the South Caucasus Integrated Border Management Programme (SCIBMP), an 
assistance tool towards increased cooperation.87 The SCIBMP pilots jointly 
administered border crossings.88 At the Sadakhlo-Bagratashen station,89 whose 
objective includes “inter-agency/cross-border cooperation”,90 bilateral seminars for 
Georgian and Armenian border guards are organised.91 This facilitates direct contact 
between administrators of the two countries, leads to a harmonisation of border 
control standards and results in reduced waiting periods for cross-border transit.  
Important for these technical projects is whether they do result in increased 
region-building. According to an independent assessment, SCIBMP has been widely 
                                                 
83 European Union, “Association Agreement”, op. cit., Art. 15, pp. 11-12. 
84 European Commission, Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement 
Negotiations, Eastern Partnership: Integrated Border Management Flagship Initiative, Brussels, 
2015. 
85 Huseynov, Tabib, “The EU and Azerbaijan: Destination Unclear”, in García Schmidt, Armando, 
Reiter-Zimmermann, Sibylle & Shupe, Cortnie (eds.), The European Union and the South 
Caucasus Three Perspectives on the Future of the European Project from the Caucasus, 
Gütersloh, Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2009, p. 83. 
86 European Commission, Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement 
Negotiations, op. cit., p. 2. 
87 Ibid., p. 3. 
88 “About us”, South Caucasus Integrated Border Management Programme, Tbilisi, no date. 
89 “Eastern Partnership Integrated Border Management: Armenia/Georgia Bagratashen-
Sadakhlo Crossing Point”, EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, Brussels, no date. 
90 “Provision of Equipment and Infrastructure for the Bagratashen-Sadakhlo Border Crossing 
Point”, South Caucasus Integrated Border Management Programme, Tbilisi, no date. 
91 “Bilateral Workshop Addresses Profiling and Risk Analysis at the Borders”, South Caucasus 
Integrated Border Management Programme, Tbilisi, 15 March 2015. 
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integrated in the participating countries’ “political and strategic consciousness”.92 
Equally positive remarks are issued from within the EEAS: CBM projects amount to an 
“efficient initiative with numerous participation” that increasingly “develops bilateral 
relations” beyond mere security cooperation.93 As the EEU acts less in this depoliticised 
area of security cooperation, the EU can balance out its disadvantage in the broader 
field of geopolitics and foster regional cooperation in the South Caucasus.94 
Cultural Exchange 
This subsection analyses the contribution of the EaP to regional cultural bonds in the 
South Caucasus. It first describes people-to-people contacts and then focuses on 
cultural contacts across the borders. It finds traces of various EaP initiatives to 
overcome the distrustful divides in the South Caucasus. South Caucasian social 
relations are characterised by high levels of distrust towards neighbouring countries. 
Table 3 takes the approval of economic cooperation as a proxy indicator for public 
opinion on this element and suggests three insights. First, the Armenian-Azerbaijani 
divide is a central expression of distrust. Second, Georgians are both more trusted and 
more trustful. Third, external partners are rated higher than any Caucasian partner in 
any of the three countries.  
Table 3: Approval of Economic Cooperation with Neighbours (2013)95 
 Armenia Azerbaijan Georgia 
Armenian Business Partners 91.9% 0.4% 71.1% 
Azerbaijani Business Partners 22.0% 99.2% 74.0% 
Georgian Business Partners 67.3% 78.9% 97.0% 
    
European Business Partners 76.1% 79.8% 80.9% 
Russian Business Partners 88.5% 85.5% 81.1% 
Notes: Answers “Don’t know”, “Refuse to answer” as well as missing cases 
excluded from the analysis.  
                                                 
92 Roehling, Hardy & Cooper, Adrian, Supporting Integrated Border Management Systems in 
the South Caucasus: Final Assessment Report, International Centre for Migration Policy 
Development, Brussels, September 2012, p. 6. 
93 Interview Iarochevitch, op. cit. 
94 Interview Medina Navarro, op. cit. 
95 Items used: BUSINARM (“Can you please tell me whether you approve or disapprove of 
people of your ethnicity doing business with Armenians.”), BUSINAZE (“Can you please tell me 
whether you approve or disapprove of people of your ethnicity doing business with 
Azerbaijanis.”), BUSINEUR (“Can you please tell me whether you approve or disapprove of 
people of your ethnicity doing business with Europeans.”), BUSINGEO (“Can you please tell me 
whether you approve or disapprove of people of your ethnicity doing business with 
Georgians.”) and BUSINRUS (“Can you please tell me whether you approve or disapprove of 
people of your ethnicity doing business with Russians.”) from Caucasus Resource Research 
Centre, op. cit. 
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This status quo of intra-Caucasian distrust is problematic for the contribution of 
the EaP to region-building. Not only does the evidence displayed in Table 3 inhibit 
economic interdependence as analysed above, but the distrust also impedes the 
development of people-to-people contacts. In this sense, it is sobering that the 
relevant multilateral panel under the EaP reported that “another area which remained 
untouched […] was Regional Cooperation and Confidence Building”.96 The 
assessment from the EEAS therefore applies that region-building under the EaP is 
constrained by the “lack of confidence, which we did not manage to overcome”.97 
Nonetheless, there are a number of contrary initiatives, to which this section 
turns next. One dimension to look at are projects facilitating educational contacts.  
The Commission has provided more than 100 million € of Erasmus funding for the entire 
neighbourhood.98 In 2015 alone, around 1000 students from the South Caucasus 
participated in this programme. Additionally, almost 300 regional meetings took place 
between youth activists and decision-makers using EaP funding.99 Admittedly, 
however, purely quantitative figures do not provide empirical evidence for the EEAS’s 
“explicit intention of creating people-to-people contacts” on a large scale.100  
Thus, another source for people-to-people contacts is the plethora of 
multilateral bodies under the EaP. In the words of Kostanyan, the Civil Society Forum 
“has indeed become a fantastic tool to establish relationships and trust and to 
develop a sense of solidarity”.101 Nonetheless, Azerbaijani members of the Euronest 
Parliamentary Assembly refused to attend its annual session in Yerevan, the Armenian 
capital.102 This shows the limits to the facilitation of people-to-people contacts through 
the multilateral dimension of the EaP. Conflicting political narratives tend to reaffirm 
instead of dissolve the distrust across the region. 
                                                 
96 Bobinski, Krysztof, “Annual Activities Report 2015: Working Group 1”, Eastern Partnership Civil 
Society Forum, Kiev, 21 November 2015, p. 4. 
97 Interview Iarochevitch, op. cit. 
98 European Commission, Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement 
Negotiations, Support for the Eastern Partnership: Stories, Facts and Figures from the European 
Neighbourhood Instrument 2014, Luxembourg, Publications Office of the European Union, 2015, 
p. 32. 
99 European Commission, SWD(2015) 77 final, op. cit., pp. 43-45. 
100 Interview Kendall, op. cit. 
101 Kostanyan, Hrant, The Civil Society Forum of the Eastern Partnership Four Years on: Progress, 
Challenges and Prospects, Report Commissioned by the Eastern Partnership Civil Society 
Forum, Brussels, January 2014, p. 3. 
102 Delcour, Laure, “In Need of a New Paradigm: Rethinking the European Neighbourhood 
Policy/Eastern Partnership”, Eastern Partnership Review, no. 20, Tallinn, Estonian Centre of 
Eastern Partnership, April 2015, p. 10. 
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The question is then, how in this constrained situation the EaP contributes to 
cultural exchanges. The multilateral objective of cultural cooperation103 was 
translated into the bilateral EU-Georgia Association Agreement.104 As main 
instruments, culture programmes are meant to strengthen “regional cultural links and 
dialogue within the EaP”, which encompasses the essence of region-building.105 
Armenia participated in 13106 and Azerbaijan in three of those regional projects in 
2014.107 Georgia is the only Caucasian country that can apply for the culture 
programmes under the Creative Europe title, but it regularly invites its neighbours into 
projects.108 These transnational cooperation projects include translation work109 or 
support for on-screen projects.110 However, the central Georgian effort focuses on the 
formulation of a culture strategy, which is an essentially bilateral exercise.111 Therefore, 
it is unlikely that the Georgian conviction, voiced by its president, of being of “a 
European culture”, is transmitted to the neighbouring countries.112  
Another example regarding cultural contacts are territorial cooperation 
projects, of which two exist in the South Caucasus. Again, both use Georgia as hub 
and link the country to its immediate neighbours. These projects should advance social 
and economic development, among others through “cultural diversity […] strengthen-
ing contacts at local level”.113 The Georgian-Armenian project pronounces cross-
cultural elements, which can be explained by the large Armenian community living in 
the relevant Georgian provinces.114 As the EEU does not provide any comparable 
projects or funding − which in the case of the EU is in the range of 450.000 € for culture 
                                                 
103 European Commission, Eastern Partnership Platform 4: Core Objectives and Work 
Programme 2014-2017, Ref. Ares(2014)80541, Brussels, 15 January 2014, pp. 1-2. 
104 European Union, “Association Agreement”, op. cit., Art. 374(1), p. 125. 
105 “Eastern Partnership Culture Programme”, EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, Brussels, no date.  
106 European Commission, Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in Armenia: 
Progress in 2014 and Recommendations for Actions, SWD(2015) 63 final, Brussels, 25 March 2015, 
p. 14. 
107 European Commission, SWD(2015) 64 final, op. cit., p. 14. 
108 “Eligibility of Eastern Partnership Countries”, Culture & Creativity: EU-Eastern Partnership 
Programme, Kiev, 2015. 
109 “Culture Sub-Programme”, Culture & Creativity: EU-Eastern Partnership Programme, Kiev, 
2015. 
110 “MEDIA Sub-Programme”, Culture & Creativity: EU-Eastern Partnership Programme, Kiev, 
2015. 
111 “Strategy”, Culture & Creativity: EU-Eastern Partnership Programme, Kiev, 2015. 
112 Margvelashvili, Giorgi, President of Georgia, “US Council of Foreign Relations”, Speech, 29 
September 2015. 
113 Eastern Partnership Territorial Cooperation, Strategy for the Eastern Partnership Territorial 
Cooperation Programmes, Tbilisi, no date, p. 4. 
114 Eastern Partnership Territorial Cooperation, Armenia-Georgia: Joint Operational Programme, 
Tbilisi, 10 June 2014, pp. 9-10. 
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alone115 − territorial cooperation is an example for the EU’s singular effort towards 
furthering cultural exchanges. In conclusion, however, the scope of EU contributions in 
cultural exchanges pales in comparison to the problems for region-building that follow 
from South Caucasian distrust. 
Explaining EU Region-Building: Towards Testable Hypotheses 
 
This final section expands on the descriptive analysis provided above. It first suggests 
three general hypotheses on the mechanisms of external region-building that can be 
empirically tested on the EaP or other policies on regionalisation. Second, it outlines 
some of the limitations inherent to these findings. 
The preceding analysis traces the links between a multitude of policies under 
the EaP and region-building in the specific case of the South Caucasus. From this 
analysis the question emerges whether there are overarching mechanisms that 
explain the EU’s contributions towards region-building. This subsection argues that 
there are three general contributions towards region-building, which are expressed in 
testable hypotheses. 
First, the findings reflect the fact that the EaP at large embodies a “novel two-
track approach” in combining bilateral and multilateral dimensions.116 Repeatedly, 
the analysis suggests the existence of an interaction between these two dimensions in 
terms of region-building. Whereas European standards are bilaterally promoted, the 
existence of a shared framework subsequently facilitates cross-border policy 
formations, for instance in the field of environmental cooperation. In parallel to this, 
Georgia plays a central role as a hub for European projects on all four dimensions of 
region-building. Since Armenian-Azerbaijani cooperation is severely restricted, 
Georgia needs to connect them. The EaP’s bilateral dimension allows to address 
Georgia directly and to later on advance the relevant contractual obligations of the 
Association Agreement on a multilateral basis. At the same time, however, it can be 
argued, for instance with regard to geopolitical alliances, that there is bilateral 
divergence in the South Caucasus. Multilaterally, tense relations result in confrontation 
                                                 
115 Ibid., p. 15. 
116 Korosteleva, Elena, A., Natorski, Michal & Simão, Licínia, “The Eastern Dimension of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy: Practices, Instruments and Social Structures”, East European 
Politics, vol. 29, no. 3, 2013, p. 257. 
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instead of cooperation, which defeats the goal of South Caucasian region-building. 
Nonetheless, the case of the South Caucasus suggests the general hypothesis that  
(H1)  The combination of bilateral and multilateral elements contributes to region-
building.117  
Second, the findings across all four dimensions of region-building suggest a split 
between top-down and bottom-up processes. As divisive political discourses disrupt 
cooperation and trust on a number of issues, the EaP’s contribution becomes most 
salient in technical issues. Joint management of border crossings or infrastructure 
projects on main transport axes are a case in point here. In other words, the bottom-
up process of functional linkages on the administrative and technical level removes 
some discursive obstacles to cross-regional action on the political level. This opens the 
way for cooperation and thus contributes positively to region-building. Arguably, 
however, this abstraction of the analysis has more predictive than observational value. 
In the difficult context of the South Caucasus it remains to be answered, to what extent 
administrative cooperation can in fact contribute to region-building. In reference to 
functionalist integration theory,118 it is worthwhile to formulate the second general 
hypothesis that  
(H2)  Spill-overs from administrative and technical levels to political levels contribute 
to region-building. 
Third, Börzel assumes that non-state actors “not only define state preferences or 
pressure and persuade them into building regional institutions, but engage in their own 
regional institution building”.119 The analysis refers to a number of working groups and 
panels across the EaP. These bodies provide venues for non-state actors to work 
towards region-building, leading external observers to point to socialisation effects.120 
                                                 
117 As normative underpinning for this hypothesis see also the argument that international 
regimes with bilateral and multilateral elements are most effective in Thompson, Alexander & 
Verdier, Daniel, “Multilateralism, Bilateralism, and Regime Design”, International Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 58, no. 1, 2014, pp. 15-28. 
118 For instance following the argument that functional-administrative and elite-political links 
initiate a deepening of regional integration processes in Tranholm-Mikkelsen, Jeppe, “Neo-
Functionalism – Obstinate or Obsolete: A Reappraisal in the Light of the New Dynamism of the 
EC”, Millennium – Journal of International Studies, vol. 20, no. 1, 1991, pp. 12-15. 
119 Börzel, Tanja A., “Comparative Regionalism: A New Research Agenda”, KFG Working Paper 
Series, no. 28, Berlin, Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) “The Transformative Power of Europe“, 
August 2011, p. 5. 
120 Kostanyan, Hrant & Vandecasteele, Bruno, “The Socialization Potential of the Eastern 
Partnership Civil Society Forum”, Eastern Journal of European Studies, vol. 4, no. 2, 2013, pp. 95–
110. 
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However, non-state actors were absent from the interviews conducted within the 
scope of this study. Even if prompted, none of the respondents mentioned the Civil 
Society Forum or other non-state representatives. In fact, most aspects of the analysis 
show that the distrust between South Caucasian societies, both on the highest 
governmental and on grassroots non-state levels, permeates all interaction. Seven 
years of the Civil Society Forum have not changed this pattern, provoking the 
argument that even from a long-term perspective the study would suggest as third 
general hypothesis that  
(H3)  The inclusion of non-state actors does not contribute to region-building. 
Applying inductive reasoning, these three hypothesised mechanisms derive from the 
previous analytical steps and the initial methodological considerations. Consequently, 
limitations in these areas restrict the hypotheses’ applicability. This plays out primarily 
in two regards.  
Methodologically, the analysis and discussion are tending towards an ‘inside-
out’ perspective.121 This means that initiatives, policies and instruments of the EaP are 
taken for granted without questioning their usefulness in the South Caucasus or the 
degree to which they are desired. This bias is mitigated to some extent by relying on 
discourse analysis, but, in its most extreme form, the study explores region-building in 
the South Caucasus although the countries in the South Caucasus do not seek 
regional cooperation.  
This limitation is further perpetuated by a reliance on constructivist approaches. 
Any value-based elements of political vision are disregarded in the study. If a region is 
defined as a community of shared norms,122 then it is crucial to understand the 
foundation of these norms and values, to which the study makes no reference 
whatsoever. Thus, this paper’s methodological foundations are limited. 
Analytically, the study suffers from a limited link between data points and the 
formulation of hypotheses. The analysis takes the existence of certain policies, for 
instance the cultural funding mechanisms or regional environmental cooperation, as 
                                                 
121 Keukeleire, Stephan, “Lessons for the Practice and Analysis of EU Diplomacy from an 
‘Outside-in’ Perspective”, in Gstöhl, Sieglinde & Lannon, Erwan (eds.), The Neighbours of the 
EU’s Neighbours: Diplomatic and Geopolitical Dimensions beyond the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, Farnham, Ashgate, 2015, pp. 227-228. 
122 Simão, Licínia, “Region-Building in the Eastern Neighbourhood: Assessing EU Regional Policies 
in the South Caucasus”, East European Politics, vol. 29, no. 3, 2013, p. 288. 
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an indicator for region-building without first assessing in-depth their de facto 
effectiveness. In other words, the study’s blind spot is impact.  
The formulation of the three hypotheses implicitly assumes that there is an 
impact of the EaP’s policies and initiatives on South Caucasian region-building. The 
second hypothesis, for instance, is silently based on the claim that the REC or CBM 
measures have fostered something of a South Caucasian regional understanding. In 
parallel to that, the third hypothesis implies that the EaP’s impact on non-state actors 
has been sufficiently small to exclude them from the mechanical understanding of 
region-building.  
However, empirical proof for these claims on impact remains scarce. This is due 
to the fact that this study did not attempt to analytically disassociate mechanisms from 
impact. To address this shortcoming, the study would have to rely on more insights from 
the EaP’s funding institutions, mostly the Commission, and from its leading 
administrators on the ground. Since the hypotheses do contain an implicit reference 
to the policy’s impact, this limitation consequently indicates a potentially insufficient 
link between the analysis of several EaP policies and overarching hypotheses 
regarding region-building. 
Notwithstanding these methodological and analytical limitations, the study 
offers a policy relevant extension of existing literature on the South Caucasus, which 
has explored choices from within the country,123 legal questions,124 or singular sectors 
of region-building.125 In addition, the hypotheses derived from this analysis can be used 
to structure explorations of other EU region-building projects. For instance, this would 
apply to Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, which are equally addressed under the EaP, 
or to the EU’s Southern neighbours. Additionally, there are various non-European 
region-building projects worldwide. The contribution of external policies and projects 
can be better analysed with reliance on the three general mechanisms suggested as 
hypotheses above. 
Conclusion 
 
                                                 
123 Delcour, Laure, “Competing Region-Building Projects”, op. cit., p. 318. 
124 Dragneva, Rilka & Wolczuk, Kataryna, “Commitment, Asymmetry and Flexibility: Making 
Sense of Eurasian Economic Integration”, in Dragneva, Rilka & Wolczuk, Kataryna (eds.), 
Eurasian Economic Integration: Law, Policy & Politics, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2013, pp. 204-
221. 
125 German, Tracey, Good Neighbours or Distant Relatives, op. cit. 
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This paper departs from the observation that the promotion of regionalism is central to 
EU foreign policy. In the post-Soviet sphere, this approach grew incrementally, 
culminating in the EaP, whose stylised objective is regionalisation. However, the 
understanding of the mechanisms behind region-building through EU policies is not 
well developed. Consequently, this study investigates how the EU contributes to 
region-building in its neighbourhood. It suggests a constructivist understanding of 
region-building on four dimensions, conceptualising region-building as the creation of 
economic, political, security and cultural linkages.  
The paper answers the question in two steps. First, it analyses the EaP’s 
contributions to region-building in the case of the South Caucasus. This exploration 
follows the four-fold linkages that form a region. As for economic interdependence, 
the study shows that transportation and energy networks are promoted in order to 
expand on low-level Caucasian trade. Regarding political narratives, technical 
cooperation and regulatory harmonisation are essential to balance out divisive 
regional discourses. In relation to security cooperation, CBM projects stand in the face 
of divergent alliance strategies and persistent cross-border conflicts in the region. 
Regarding cultural exchanges, low-level projects on territorial cooperation or 
educational people-to-people contacts are inhibited by high levels of distrust that 
mark the status quo.  
In general terms, these findings suggest that the EU, when faced with social and 
political obstacles to region-building, should focus on technical and administrative 
initiatives to lay the foundations for cross-regional linkages. However, it must not forget 
addressing misgivings among elites as well as among the public in order for region-
building to take hold in the long run. In the specific case of the South Caucasus, the 
policy proposal for the EU would be to continue with its differentiated approach to 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Differentiation provides a shortcut to those areas, 
in which technical cooperation is possible and desired, despite the persistence of 
distrust across the three countries. 
Second, this study extrapolates three general mechanisms and concludes that 
the EU contributes to region-building by means of sectoral bottom-up approaches 
that combine bilateral and multilateral logics. These hypothesised mechanisms derive 
from the analysis of the EaP’s contribution in the South Caucasus. First, the study 
suggests a positive effect of combining bilateral and multilateral approaches. This 
conclusion follows from the observation that Georgia is bilaterally used as a hub to 
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multilaterally bridge the Armenian-Azerbaijani divide. Second, the study advances 
neo-functionalist advocacy of technical cooperation and positive spill-over effects. 
This is the logical conclusion from the toxic political discourse which inhibits a common 
regional understanding. Third, the study remains doubtful about the contributions of 
non-state actors towards region-building. This conclusion acknowledges the fact that 
non-state actors in the South Caucasus replicate rather than overcome the anti-
regionalist discourses. 
These hypotheses derive from an analysis of multiple policies and initiatives of 
the EaP on South Caucasian linkages, specifically economic interdependence, 
political discourses, security cooperation and cultural exchanges. To assess their 
general applicability, these hypotheses need to be tested through further research on 
the EU’s promotion of region-building outside the South Caucasus. 
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